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CASEY AND ITS IMPACT ON
ABORTION REGULATION
Michael F. Moses*
This year marks two important anniversaries. Roe v. Wade1 is
thirty-one years old. Planned Parenthood v. Casey2 just turned
twelve. Casey is less of a household name than Roe. But in some
ways, Casey is more important because it changed the way courts
review abortion laws. Casey did not make it easier to ban abortion.
After Casey, just as before, the government may not prohibit abor-
tion before viability, nor prevent any abortion necessary to pre-
serve a woman's life or health.' But for abortion laws that fall
short of a ban, Casey declared that courts should use an undue bur-
den standard, 4 a standard that is more lenient than the strict scru-
tiny used in Roe.
Why the change? The Court admitted in Casey that in previous
cases it had not given enough recognition to the states' interest in
protecting human life.6 Combined with the new standard, this
meant that after Casey states would be freer to regulate abortion
than previous cases had allowed.7 Casey explicitly overruled ear-
lier decisions that had been too begrudging of state efforts to regu-
late the abortion procedure.8
That was how the decision was read by both sides of the abortion
debate. Janet Benshoof, a longtime abortion rights advocate,
* Associate General Counsel, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. In
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and other religious organizations as amici. The views expressed here, however, are
those of the author and not necessarily those of the Conference or its member
Bishops.
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
3. Id. at 879.
4. Id. at 877. The joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter ex-
plained that an undue burden is a "state regulation that has the purpose or effect of
placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion." Id.
5. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155-56. The Court will only uphold regulations that are nar-
rowly drawn to justify compelling state interests in cases in which "fundamental
rights, such as those in abortion cases, are implicated." Id.
6. Casey, 505 U.S. at 871.
7. Id. at 879-80.
8. See id. at 870; see also Janet Benshoof, Planned Parenthood v. Casey: The Im-
pact of the New Undue Burden Standard on Reproductive Health Care, 269 JAMA
2249, 2252-53 (1993).
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warned that Casey "severely limited [the] women's constitutional
protections" given in Roe.9 A less restrained Planned Parenthood
of New York City, two days after Casey was decided, placed a full
page ad in the New York Times warning that "Roe v. Wade is
dead." 10 Roe's demise was greatly exaggerated. There was, how-
ever, universal agreement that Casey left states in a better position
to regulate abortion. Just last term, Justice Scalia reminded us that
"Casey provided a less expansive right to abortion than did Roe.""
One way to assess the impact of Casey is to therefore to ask
whether the courts have kept the promise made in Casey. Is it eas-
ier now to regulate abortion? Do courts now defer to legislatures
more than they did before Casey? The answer is mixed.
In the twelve years since Casey, judges have rejected some of the
more incredible claims made by the abortion industry, but usually
only after years of litigation.12 For example, in Montana, a physi-
cian's assistant challenged a law that said only doctors can perform
abortions. 3 It seems just common sense that states do not violate
the Constitution if they forbid non-physicians from performing sur-
gery. Abortion is a surgical procedure. But a federal court of ap-
peals struck the law down'4 and it took a Supreme Court decision
to get it reinstated. 15
In Texas, the abortion industry claimed that it was an equal pro-
tection violation to impose stricter regulations on doctors' offices
that perform over 300 abortions a year than on those that perform
fewer.16 It is not unusual for legislatures to use numerical cutoffs.' 7
9. Benshoof, supra note 8, at 2249.
10. Advertisement, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1992, at A17.
11. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2489 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
12. See, e.g., Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968 (1997) (approximately two years
of litigation); Women's Med. Ctr. of N.W. Houston v. Bell, 248 F. 3d 411 (5th Cir.
2001) (same); A Woman's Choice East Side Clinic v. Newman, 904 F. Supp. 1434,
1439-40 (S.D. Ind. 1995), enforced, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (S.D. Ind. 2001), rev'd, 305
F.3d 684 (7th Cir. 2002) (approximately five years of litigation).
13. Armstrong v. Mazurek, 906 F. Supp. 561, 563-65 (D. Mont. 1995), vacated by
94 F.3d 566, rev'd, 520 U.S. 968 (1997).
14. Armstrong, 94 F.3d at 566.
15. See Mazurek, 520 U.S. 968.
16. Women's Med. Ctr. of N.W. Houston v. Archer, 159 F. Supp. 2d 414, 418 (S.D.
Tex. 1999), affd in part, and rev'd in part sub nom. Women's Med. Ctr. of N.W. Hous-
ton v. Bell, 248 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2001).
17. For example, many of the employment discrimination laws apply to employers
with a certain number of people on their payroll. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (2003) (applicable to employers with fifteen or more employees); Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2003) (applicable to
employers with twenty or more employees).
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But a federal judge struck down the Texas law 18 and again, it took
an appeal to get it reinstated. 19
In Indiana, Planned Parenthood claimed that a law imposed an
undue burden because it required doctors to meet face to face with
patients before performing an abortion.2 0 The purpose of the law
was to simply to see that women got information about their
pregnancies and about abortion before undergoing an abortion.21
It seems clear that nothing in the Constitution prevents states from
requiring doctors simply to meet face to face with their patients to
talk about a procedure the doctor is about to perform on the pa-
tient. But, again, a federal judge struck the law down. 2 And
again, it took an appeal to get it reinstated. 3
All of the claims described above were ultimately rejected. But
it took many years of litigation. During all that time, the laws be-
ing challenged were not being enforced because they had been en-
joined while the litigation was pending. 4
Unfortunately, some of the bad decisions have not been reversed
on appeal. For example, a Texas regulation provided that abortion
clinics had to treat patients in a way that would "enhance each pa-
tient's dignity. ' 25 A court thought that the notion of "dignity" too
vague to be enforceable and struck it down even though federal
health regulations use the same word repeatedly in similar con-
texts.26 A parental consent abortion law in Arizona was struck
18. Archer, 159 F. Supp. 2d at 468.
19. Bell, 248 F.3d 411.
20. See A Woman's Choice East Side Clinic v. Newman, 904 F. Supp. 1424, 1439-
40 (S.D. Ind. 1995), enforced, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (S.D. Ind. 2001), rev'd, 305 F.3d
684 (7th Cir. 2002).
21. See Newman, 305 F.3d at 702-04.
22. Newman, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 1181.
23. Newman, 305 F.3d at 693.
24. See supra note 12.
25. Women's Med. Ctr. of N.W. Houston v. Bell, 248 F.3d 411, 422 (5th Cir. 2001).
26. Id. at 422. Regulatory requirements that patients be treated with dignity are
set out in a variety of federal regulations. See, e.g., 38 C.F.R. § 17.33(a)(1) (2003)
(patients "have a right to be treated with dignity in a humane environment that af-
fords them both reasonable protection from harm and appropriate privacy with re-
gard to their personal needs"); 42 C.F.R. § 51b.103(c) (2003) (grantees for preventive
health services must provide the government with assurances that "services are pro-
vided in a manner which preserves human dignity and maximizes acceptance"); 42
C.F.R. § 56.603(k) (2003) (a project for operating a migrant health program must be
"operated in a manner calculated to preserve human dignity"); 42 C.F.R. § 59.5(a)(3)
(2003) (family planning services must be provided "in a manner which protects the
dignity of the individual"); 42 C.F.R. § 405.2138(c) (2003) (suppliers of end-stage re-
nal disease services must treat patients with "consideration, respect, and full recogni-
tion of their individuality and personal needs, including the need for privacy in
treatment"); 42 C.F.R. § 483.15(a) (2003) (long-term care facilities must "promote
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down because, though it had a judicial bypass, it did not have spe-
cific deadlines.2 7 The Supreme Court has held that bypass petitions
have to be heard promptly,28 but it will never be known how Ari-
zona would have implemented its law because it never got a
chance.
That is where things stand today. Casey said states should be
freer to regulate abortion,2 9 but courts are continuing to scrutinize
abortion laws closely, and in many cases striking down what appear
to be reasonable regulations.3 °
There are three specific problems with Casey that have allowed
this situation to continue and to fester. First of all, it is not clear
what an undue burden is. The Supreme Court defined it as a "sub-
stantial obstacle, '31 but those words seem as vague as the words
they define. The dissenters in Casey thought the undue burden was
"based even more on a judge's subjective determinations than was
the trimester framework" that Casey rejected.32 In sum, Casey did
not give us a clear test.
A second problem is deciding to whom the undue burden test
should be applied. Is a law invalid if it unduly burdens everyone's
right to an abortion or if it burdens only some women? Most
courts, following the joint opinion in Casey, say that it is the lat-
ter.33 But that seems like a throwback to Roe. If an abortion law is
care for residents in a manner and in an environment that maintains or enhances each
resident's dignity and respect in full recognition of his or her individuality"); 42 C.F.R.
§ 483.152(b)(4)(iv) (2003) (nurse aide training programs must include training in
"[a]llowing the resident to make personal choices, providing and reinforcing other
behavior consistent with the resident's dignity").
27. See Planned Parenthood v. Lawall, No. 98-15862, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
33154, at *12-13 (9th Cir. June 9, 1999).
28. See Planned Parenthood v. Lawall, 193 F.3d 1042, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999)
(O'Scannlain, J., dissenting) (citing Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990)), re-
printed as amended by No. 98-15862, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 33154.
29. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992).
30. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
31. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877.
32. Id. at 965 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
33. See id. at 894-95. Casey invalidated a spousal notification provision that, in the
view of the authors of the joint opinion, unduly burdened the abortion right of a
"large fraction" of women out of a total universe of women for whom the law was an
actual restriction, excluding those women who voluntarily informed their spouses of
an intent to have an abortion and who were not exempt under the statute. Id. By
choosing such an artificially small universe, it was virtually assured that even a small
number of women for whom the law acted as a substantial obstacle would constitute a
"large fraction." See id.
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invalid because it burdens only a few people, that is much like the
strict scrutiny Casey rejected.34
A third problem is that Casey has not prevented courts from en-
joining laws that have never gone into effect. Planned Parenthood
v. Lawall is a good illustration. It is often difficult to know or
predict what precise impact a law will have if it has never been
enforced. 6 Yet courts continue to strike down laws that have
never been enforced based frequently on speculative evidence.37
Has the Supreme Court done anything since Casey to fix these
problems? Not yet. The most interesting thing about the last
twelve years is just how little the Supreme Court has had to say
about abortion. The Court has heard a few cases involving pro-life
demonstrators, but those are more about free speech than abor-
tion, at least on the surface. 38 In these cases, which are mostly flit-
ting around the edges of the abortion issue, demonstrators find no
natural ally, for those Justices who might be thought most sympa-
thetic to speech rights are generally most committed to the abor-
tion right.39
Four years ago the Court took up the partial birth abortion issue
in Stenberg v. Carhart.4 ° It was the first substantive abortion case
the Court had heard since Casey. Unfortunately, Carhart was a
step backwards. Usually if the government bans an unsafe medical
procedure, the courts will not interfere even if some medical ex-
34. See generally id. The strict scrutiny and "large fraction" tests each strike down
laws based on their effect on only a few people. For that reason, they each require a
tight fit between legislative means and objective. In either case, overbreadth will
prove fatal.
35. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
36. See Planned Parenthood v. Lawall, 193 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 1999)
(O'Scannlain, J., dissenting), reprinted as amended by No. 98-15862, 1999 U.S. App.
LEXIS 33154.
37. See, e.g., id.
38. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000); Schenek v. Pro-Choice Network, 519
U.S. 357 (1997); Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753 (1994); Bray v. Alex-
andria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993).
39. Compare for example, the majority and dissenting opinions in Watchtower Bi-
ble and Tract Soc'y v. Village of Statton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002), and Stenberg v. Carhart,
530 U.S. 914 (2000). The Court's dislike of abortion cases, or at least the continuing
controversy it has stoked, is evident. Casey, 505 U.S. at 844 (noting with apparent
displeasure that "the United States, as it has done in five other cases in the last dec-
ade, again asks us to overrule Roe"); Id. at 999 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment
in part, dissenting in part) (noting "the marches, the mail, the protests aimed at in-
ducing us to change our opinions" about abortion).
40. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
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perts think it is safe. a1 In Carhart there was conflicting, or at least
ambiguous evidence about whether partial birth abortion was dan-
gerous for women.42
But instead of deferring to the legislature, the Court held that if
there is significant or substantial medical authority that an abortion
procedure is safe, states cannot ban it even if other evidence shows
the procedure is dangerous.43 That means the government can
never ban an abortion procedure if the abortion industry can find a
few authorities within the industry who say it is safe. It is compara-
ble to saying that a car maker has a right to make a dangerous car,
and the government may not interfere, as long as someone with the
company says it is safe.
Carhart and lower court decisions show rather plainly that the
courts have not yet given states the latitude to regulate abortion
that Casey promised. Could things change? Yes. Even though it
has borne little fruit to date, Casey could be a pathway for change.
Roe's strict scrutiny was usually fatal.44 Casey's undue burden test
at least gives courts room to uphold abortion laws. In twenty
years, we have moved from a situation where laws were almost cer-
tain to be struck down to one where there is a real chance they can
be upheld.
Casey may have laid the groundwork for change. Our task now
is to encourage the Supreme Court and lower courts to define and
apply the undue burden test in a way that truly is more deferential
to legislatures. Absent wholesale recognition of the fundamental
error made in Roe, the courts should honor the promise made in
Casey to permit greater regulation of abortion and should apply
the more lenient standard of judicial review announced in that
case.
Four specific areas seem ripe for legislative action. First, states
should enact real bans on post-viability abortions. It is true that a
post-viability ban requires a life/health under Roe45 and Casey.4 6
But the exception should not swallow the rule. Ever since Roe, the
41. See, e.g., Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 604 (1977) (physician has no right to
practice medicine according to his own unfettered judgment); Lambert v. Yellowley,
272 U.S. 581, 596 (1926) ("there is no right to practice medicine which is not
subordinate to the police power of the States").
42. Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 932-35.
43. Id. at 932.
44. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747 (1986).
45. 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973).
46. 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992).
810
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Court has insisted that the Constitution does not require abortion
on demand. 47 That can only be true if the Constitution permits a
post-viability ban with teeth.
For example, in 1997, Justice Thomas, joined by two other jus-
tices, wrote that he did not read the life/health exception for post-
viability abortions to include mental health.48 Since the Supreme
Court has explicitly rejected the notion of abortion on demand, the
entire Court and lower courts should agree that the life/health ex-
ception excludes psychological and sociological factors, factors that
can easily be manipulated to permit abortion on demand.49
Second, states can pass laws that protect an unborn child from
harm to which the mother has not consented-laws like Laci and
Connor's Law, the Unborn Victims of Violence Act. 0 Third, states
can pass legislation to ensure that women know about the risks of
abortion. That can be done with informed consent laws,5 1 govern-
ment-funded public service ads,52 and with malpractice suits.
Fourth, states can protect the rights of people and institutions
that do not want to pay for or participate in abortion. This last
point warrants special attention. The abortion industry and its al-
lies have been arguing that religious denominations and their insti-
tutions should not be allowed to be different.5 3 They have claimed
that if church agencies want to serve the public, receive public
47. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 189 (1973). Thirty years later, the Court contin-
ues to note that the abortion right is not absolute. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472,
2477 (2003).
48. Voinovich v. Women's Med. Prof'l Corp., 523 U.S. 1036, 1037 (1998) (Thomas,
J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
49. Even a "life" exception, loosely defined, is susceptible to manipulation, as in
the case of a woman who claimed to be suicidally distraught over her pregnancy, as
was claimed in one well publicized case in Ireland. See BBC News, Irish PM Concedes
Abortion Defeat (Mar. 7, 2002), available at http:/news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/europe/
1859287.stm.
50. See Nat'l Right to Life Committee, State Homicide Laws That Recognize Un-
born Victims (Feb. 2, 2004), available at http://www.nrlc.org/Unbornvictims/
Statehomic idelaws092302.html.
51. See Carrie Gordon Earl, Abortion Law in the United States, Citizen Link (Sept.
9, 2003), at http://www.family.org/cforum/fosi/bioethics/facts/a0027729.cfm. Thirty
states currently have informed consent laws, which mandate that "women receive full
medical disclosure of possible risks associated with and alternatives to abortion." Id.
52. See, e.g., Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 588 (1998);
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194-95 (1991).
53. See, e.g., Catherine Weiss, Director, ACLU Reproductive Freedom Project,
testimony before the Health Subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Energy and Commerce (July 11, 2002) (arguing that religiously affili-
ated medical and social service providers should not have conscience protection),
available at http://www.aclu.org/ReproductiveRights/ReproductiveRights.cfm?ID=
10513&c=224.
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funds, or hire people beyond their own co-religionists, they must
provide their clients and employees, or pay for, what the church
agencies object to on moral or religious grounds. 4
Many states, for example, now mandate health insurance cover-
age for contraception with limited or no conscientious exemption.
And recently there has been a move to make all hospitals provide
emergency contraception. 56 Battle lines to date have been drawn
largely over contraception. But if a religious denomination and its
institutions can be required to provide and pay for contraception in
the face of an explicit religious objection,5 7 can abortion be far be-
hind? Court cases have been filed in New York and California to
challenge state contraceptive mandates with inadequate conscience
protection. 8 These cases are important because they involve a
church's ability to practice what it preaches. And ultimately that is
more than just an abortion or contraception issue-that is an issue
of religious and associational liberty as well as free speech.
So far I have been discussing the parameters established by
Casey. I do however, want to make a few brief remarks about the
decision itself. I doubt any criticism of Casey has been more devas-
tating than one made recently by Michael Stokes Paulsen.59 Pro-
fessor Paulsen does not mince words. He is correct in his
description of the dimensions of the tragedy and the stunning injus-
tice that Casey perpetuates. 60 By virtue of that decision, as he
points out, literally millions of innocent human beings have been
(and will continue to be) lost to abortion.61 This is an evil of un-
speakable proportion.
Many of the reasons given for continued recognition of an abor-
tion right seem to have no logical limit to unborn children and
therefore prove too much. If pregnancy and childbirth can be a
source of emotional or financial distress (hopefully for many they
54. Id.
55. See A. Sonfield, Twenty States Now Require Contraceptive Insurance Coverage,
5 GUtTrIMACHER REP. 3 (2002), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/
grO 50313a.html.
56. See Compassionate Assistance for Rape Emergencies Act, H.R. Res. 2527,
108th Cong. (2003).
57. Conscientious objection to abortion is not unconditionally protected in the
federal code. See 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7 (2003).
58. Catholic Charities v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176 (App. 2001), review
granted and opinion superseded, 31 P.3d 1271 (Cal. 2001); Catholic Charities v. Serio,
No. 8229-02 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Albany 2003) (Lamont, J.).
59. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Worst Constitutional Decision of All Time, 78
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 995 (2003).
60. See id at 1026-35.
61. Id. at 1027-28.
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are also a source of joy and fulfillment), is this any different for
households with infant children? Our courts have not made it im-
possible for legislatures to ban the outright killing of born infants.
Everyone recoils in horror when they hear tales of infanticide.
If no sociological, psychological, health, or other factor justifies
the taking of a born child's life (and none does), if that child's life is
universally to be regarded as inviolable (and it is), how can we
reach a different conclusion for a child at an earlier stage of devel-
opment, a child just as human as the one now born? The child's
status as a human being rationally cannot hinge on its dependence
on others. Newborns and, indeed, many adults are dependent on
others for their care and are in no sense less human because of it.
Yet reflexively these arguments, unsound as they are, continue
to be made. When debating the ban on partial birth abortion, for
example, one senator showed a picture of an unborn child's hand
and asked whether it was the hand of a person or a piece of prop-
erty, to which the bill's chief opponent said, "I am not a doctor and
I am not God... I trust other human beings to make these deci-
sions."" As I say, these arguments prove too much. One cannot
be agnostic about the state's power to protect human life at a par-
ticular stage of life without, by the same logic, calling into question
the state's power to protect human life at any other stage.
One's human status and dignity cannot depend upon an act of
will. If the unborn child lost by Laci Peterson63 was human, as it
certainly was, so is the child lost to abortion. If the death of one is
a tragedy, so is the death of the other. To hold that only those
people are human whom I want to recognize as human is to enter a
heartless and fundamentally evil world, a world in which human
will triumphs over human dignity.
The greatest irony is that abortion is argued as a right at all.
There are at least two great principles enshrined in law that abor-
tion violates. One is equal justice for all. Another is the special
solicitude that the law has always shown, from its very beginnings,
for people who are on the edges of society, the vulnerable, the
marginalized. To suggest that freedom and equality are enhanced
by recognizing a private power to extinguish the life of an innocent
62. 149 CONG. REC. S12,921 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 2003) (statement of Sen. Boxer).
63. Laci Peterson was eight months pregnant when she was reported missing from
her California home in December, 2002. Her body, and the body of the unborn child
she was carrying, was recovered five months later. Her husband, Scott Peterson is
currently on trial for murder. See The Official Site of Laci Peterson, What's Happen-
ing (June 8, 2003), at http://www.lacipeterson.com/whatshappening/index.html.
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person turns every rational understanding of freedom and equality
on its head.
Until the Court reverses itself or the Constitution is amended,
we are left only with Casey's promise to permit greater latitude in
the regulation of abortion. Given what is at stake, that promise
should be taken up to the fullest extent. The Court will not permit
a blanket ban.64 It will, however, permit restrictions after viability
and throughout pregnancy.65 It will permit requirements designed
to ensure informed consent. 66 It will permit the protection of un-
born children when the mother does not consent to the child's de-
struction.67 It remains to be seen whether the Court will preserve
the freedom of our citizenry and their governmental, religious, and
other institutions not to participate in abortion.
History suggests that as a rule "constitutional law changes but
slowly. ' ' 68 Casey provides one step toward reversal. It rejects
Roe's trimester methodology and strict scrutiny approach.69 Per-
haps most importantly, the authors of the controlling opinion in
Casey could not bring themselves to say that Roe was correctly de-
cided.70 A Court so unsure of Roe and so willing to stray from
64. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878-79 (1992).
65. See id.
66. Casey, 505 U.S. at 881.
67. Roe and Casey make clear that the abortion right hinges on the mother's con-
sent to abort the child. No one contests the government's interest in protecting the
health and safety of the unborn child where the mother wishes to carry the child to
term.
68. Mark E. Chopko, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services: A Path to Constitu-
tional Equilibrium, 12 Campbell L. Rev. 181, 214 (1990). See generally Michael Pfei-
fer, Abandoning Error: Self Correction by the Supreme Court, in ABORTION AND THE
CONSTITUTION 3 (Dennis J. Horan et al. eds., 1987).
69. Casey, 505 U.S. at 872-73, 877.
70. Id. at 871.
We do not need to say whether each of us, had we been Members of the
Court when the valuation of the state interest came before it as an original
matter, would have concluded, as the Roe Court did, that its weight is insuf-
ficient to justify a ban on abortions prior to viability even when it is subject
to certain exceptions. The matter is not before us in the first instance, and
coming as it does after nearly 20 years of litigation in Roe's wake we are
satisfied that the immediate question is not the soundness of Roe's resolu-
tion of the issue, but the precedential force that must be accorded to its
holding.
Id. By thus declining to state that Roe was correctly decided, the Casey opinion
"leaves a reader ... with the nagging sense that a majority of the Court reaffirmed
Roe, even though a differently constituted majority (the four dissenters plus one or
more of the authors of the Joint Opinion) believed Roe to have been wrongly de-
cided." Mark E. Chopko & Michael F. Moses, Assisted Suicide: Still a Wonderful
Life?, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 519, 549 n.104 (1995) (quoting Paul B. Linton,
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essential features of that case will not remain forever committed to
a constitutional interpretation that only perpetuates it.
Planned Parenthood v. Casey: The Flight From Reason in the Supreme Court, 13 ST.
Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 15, 19 (1993)).
lp
